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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
While confined at the Moshannon Valley Correctional 
Center (“MVCC”), a private prison operated by The GEO 
Group, Inc. under contract with the Federal Bureau of Prisons, 
Brian Davis was denied permission to marry his fiancée, 
Fredricka Beckford.  The warden of MVCC at the time was 
George C. Wigen (together with GEO Group, the “GEO 
Defendants”), and he is the one who allegedly said no.  In 
response, Davis and Beckford (the “Appellants”) brought suit 
against the GEO Defendants and two federal officials, David 
O’Neal, the Northeast Regional Director for the Department of 
Homeland Security, and someone identified only by the title 
Federal Bureau of Prisons Administrator of the Bureau of 
Prisons Privatization Management Branch (the “BOP 
Administrator,” and, together with O’Neal, the “Federal 
Defendants”).  The Appellants assert various state and federal 
law claims against the GEO Defendants and the Federal 
Defendants, the gravamen of which is that the Appellants were 
denied the right to marry because of unlawful discrimination.   
 
On consideration of a motion to dismiss by the GEO 
Defendants, a Magistrate Judge issued a Report and 
Recommendation (the “R&R”) calling for the Appellants’ 
claims against the GEO Defendants to be dismissed for failure 
to state a claim.  The R&R also recommended, sua sponte, that 
the Appellants’ claims against the Federal Defendants be 
dismissed because those defendants had yet to receive service 
of process.  The District Court adopted the R&R in its entirety 
and, without further analysis, dismissed the Appellants’ 
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lawsuit.  The Appellants now argue that none of their claims 
were properly dismissed.  We agree that certain claims against 
the GEO Defendants were wrongly dismissed and so too were 
the claims against the Federal Defendants.  Accordingly, we 
will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the matter to the 
District Court for further proceedings. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
While imprisoned at MVCC, Davis, a Jamaican 
national, requested permission to marry non-inmate Beckford, 
a U.S. citizen of Jamaican descent. According to the 
Appellants, MVCC imposed various requirements on those 
wishing to get married, above and beyond the requirements 
specified in Federal Bureau of Prisons regulations.  The 
Appellants allege that, despite their having complied with all 
applicable requirements, including those additional ones 
imposed by MVCC, Wigen nevertheless denied their request 
to get married.   
 
MVCC almost exclusively houses foreign nationals 
who have been ordered to be deported or are facing an 
impending immigration proceeding.  The Appellants allege 
that the GEO Defendants and the Federal Defendants 
conspired to ensure that no inmate confined at MVCC can get 
married.  The rationale behind the conspiracy, according to the 
Appellants, is that the Federal Defendants did not want inmates 
getting married because it could complicate, and perhaps stop, 
removal and other immigration proceedings. The GEO 
Defendants also allegedly benefit from the conspiracy because 
married inmates may more easily transfer to other facilities, 
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while the GEO Group has a financial interest in preventing 
those transfers and keeping MVCC’s population as high as 
possible.  The Appellants allege that, since the time the GEO 
Group began operating MVCC, no inmate has ever been 
allowed to marry while incarcerated there.   
 
B. Procedural History 
 
The Appellants filed their original complaint on 
January 25, 2016, and it appears to have been refiled for some 
reason on February 8.  Two weeks later, they filed an Amended 
Complaint, which is the operative pleading in this case.  The 
Amended Complaint sets forth eleven claims, all predicated on 
the alleged unlawful deprivation of the Appellants’ right to 
marry.  For purposes of this appeal, the most significant claims 
are the demand for money damages pursuant to Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388 (1971), the allegation that the defendants conspired 
to deprive them of their civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1985(3), and the assertion that the defendants failed to adhere 
to the non-discrimination requirements of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 
1983, and 2000d.1   
 
It is unclear whether, after the filing of suit, any 
summonses were issued.  By early October 2016, none of the 
defendants had been served, and the District Court ordered 
Beckford to “take all necessary steps to serve Defendants in 
 
1 Appellants’ other claims include breach of contract, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the 
U.S. Constitution, the Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, and certain federal anti-discrimination 
regulations.  See infra n.12. 
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accordance with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
on or before November 6, 2016.” (JA 18.)  She did not comply, 
and on January 5, 2017, the Magistrate Judge issued a report 
and recommendation (an earlier one, not the R&R underlying 
the District Court decision now at issue) urging that the case 
be dismissed for failure to prosecute.  The Appellants did not 
file any objections to that recommendation and, on March 15, 
2017, the District Court adopted it and dismissed the case.  
 
Within a week of the Court’s dismissal order, Beckford 
moved to reopen the case.  That motion was granted on June 
21, 2017.  In allowing the case to proceed, the Court warned 
that the “[Appellants’] failure to serve Defendants on or before 
August 4, 2017, w[ould] result in renewed dismissal of this 
case.”  (JA 95.)  On July 31, the Appellants notified the Court 
that they had served all the defendants, and that O’Neal and the 
BOP Administrator had been served by sending them process 
at their work addresses via Federal Express and certified mail 
and, respectively.  Counsel for the GEO Defendants filed a 
notice of appearance a week later, and, on August 31, the GEO 
Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint.     
 
Notwithstanding the lack of an appearance by or answer 
from the Federal Defendants, the Appellants took no further 
action to perfect service on them until November.  On the first 
of that month, an Assistant U.S. Attorney wrote the Appellants 
a letter informing them that they had failed to comply with the 
service requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i).  
Two weeks later, the Appellants asked the District Court Clerk 
to issue additional summonses so that they could properly 
serve the Federal Defendants.  Specifically, they asked for and 
received summonses directed at O’Neal and the BOP 
Administrator, addressed to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 
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Western District of Pennsylvania and the Department of 
Justice.  On December 13, 2017, the Appellants notified the 
Court that they had sent the additional summonses for the 
Federal Defendants “via USPS” to the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
and to the Department of Justice.  (JA at 158.)   
 
Two days later, the Magistrate Judge filed the R&R.  As 
earlier described, it recommended dismissal of the Appellants’ 
lawsuit in its entirety.  In suggesting that claims against the 
Federal Defendants be dismissed, the Magistrate Judge stated 
that the Appellants had not employed “means of service … 
authorized by Rule 4” when they used certified mail and 
Federal Express to effectuate their July 2017 attempt at service.  
(JA at 13.)  The Magistrate Judge made no reference to the 
Appellants’ subsequent efforts to effect service of process on 
the Federal Defendants, including their filing just two days 
earlier stating that they had mailed summonses for those 
officials to the pertinent government offices. 
 
The Appellants objected to the R&R, arguing in part 
that the Magistrate Judge had failed to account for their 
substantial compliance with Rule 4.  They did not argue before 
the District Court, nor do they argue now, that they fully 
complied with the requirements of Rule 4.  While the R&R and 
the Appellants’ objections were pending, the Federal 
Defendants, through the U.S. Attorney’s Office, moved to 
extend the deadline to answer, plead, or otherwise respond to 
the Amended Complaint.  With respect to service on the BOP 
Administrator, the motion invoked Rule 12(a)(2) and said that 
“a response to the Amended Complaint is due on or before 
January 29, 2018[,]” based on receipt of the Amended 
Complaint and summons on November 29, 2017.  (JA at 205.)  
As to the propriety of service made on O’Neal, the motion 
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stated that counsel was “unaware whether service has been 
accomplished in accordance with Rule 4(i)(3)[.]”   (JA at 205.)  
The Magistrate Judge granted the Federal Defendant’s motion 
on January 29.       
 
Despite that, the next day the District Court adopted the 
R&R, dismissed all claims against the GEO Defendants on the 
merits, dismissed the claims against the Federal Defendants for 
failure to prosecute, and ordered the case to be closed.  The 
Court stated it had undertaken a “de novo review of the 
complaint and documents in the case[,]” but offered no 
independent analysis.  (JA at 3.)  The following day, the 
Federal Defendants moved to reopen the case so that they could 
file a motion to dismiss “in part, based on the fact that 
[Appellants] appear to have … failed to accomplish timely 
service – or service at all at least on the unnamed ‘BOP 
Administrator.’”  (JA at 211.)  The District Court declined to 
reopen the case, noting that the Appellants had already filed an 
appeal. 
   
II. DISCUSSION2 
 
A. Dismissal of the Bivens Claim 
 
The Appellants first challenge the District Court’s 
dismissal of their claim for damages pursuant to Bivens.  “The 
 
2  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331, 1343, and 1367. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review de novo a district court’s grant of 
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”  Foglia v. Renal Ventures 
Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 154 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014).  In 
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purpose of Bivens is to deter individual federal officers from 
committing constitutional violations” by subjecting them to 
personal liability.  Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 
70 (2001). The Appellants specifically accuse the defendants 
of violating their constitutional right to marry.3    Based on the 
R&R, the District Court dismissed the Bivens claim against the 
GEO Defendants because, the Court said, those defendants are 
“private, not federal, actors.”  (JA 12.)  We are deeply skeptical 
of that conclusion.   
 
 
conducting such a review, we “take as true all the factual 
allegations of the … Amended Complaint and the reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from them, but we disregard legal 
conclusions and recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 
supported by mere conclusory statements.  To survive a motion 
to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”  Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  A 
claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “[W]e may 
affirm a judgment of a lower court for any reason supported by 
the record ….”  In re Ross, 858 F.3d 779, 786 (3d Cir. 2017).  
 
3 In Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), the Supreme 
Court held that prison inmates enjoy a constitutional right to 
marry, which can be restricted in favor of legitimate 
penological interests.  See id. at 95 (“The right to marry, like 
many other rights, is subject to substantial restrictions as a 
result of incarceration.”). 
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“In the limited settings where Bivens does apply, the 
implied cause of action is the federal analog to suits brought 
against state officials under … 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”  Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675–76 (2009) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  We have accordingly recognized that 
Bivens claims, like § 1983 claims, may reach private parties 
when they engage in the federal equivalent of “state action.”  
Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 801 (3d Cir. 2001); 
cf. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936–937 (1982) 
(permitting suit under § 1983 against private corporations 
exercising “state action”).  The GEO Defendants operate 
private prisons on behalf of the federal government, which, 
among other responsibilities, entails overseeing and 
controlling the daily lives of the prisoners.  The performance 
of that function certainly appears to be the exercise of a right 
having its source in federal authority, by those who “could in 
all fairness be regarded as … federal actor[s.]”   Philip Morris 
Inc., 250 F.3d at 801; see also Pollard v. The GEO Grp., Inc., 
629 F.3d 843, 857-58 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding under the 
“public function test” that “the GEO employees act under color 
of federal law for purposes of Bivens liability”), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom. Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 132 
(2012).4  Despite that, we will affirm the Court’s dismissal of 
the Bivens claim because the Appellants are asking for an 
unsupportable extension of Bivens liability. 
 
 
4 The Supreme Court has not held that private prison 
operators cannot be liable for damages under Bivens because 
they are not “federal actors.”  Both Minneci and turned on the 
separate and distinct question of whether the plaintiffs in those 
cases had alternative remedies to a Bivens claim available to 
them. 
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We engage in a two-step inquiry when deciding whether 
to extend the reach of Bivens.  First, we ask “whether the 
request involves a claim that arises in a new context or involves 
a new category of defendants.”  Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 
735, 743 (2020) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  Second, if there is a claim that has arisen in a new 
context, we “ask whether there are any special factors [that] 
counse[l] hesitation about granting the extension.”  Id. 
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  “[I]f we have reason to pause before applying Bivens 
in a new context or to a new class of defendants[,]we reject the 
request.”  Id.  Importantly, when conducting our Bivens 
analysis, we must be mindful of the Supreme Court’s 
admonitions that “expansion of Bivens is a disfavored judicial 
activity,” that “it is doubtful” that the outcome of Bivens would 
be the same if it were decided today, and that “for almost 40 
years, [the Supreme Court] ha[s] consistently rebuffed requests 
to add to the claims allowed under Bivens.”  Id. at 472-73 
(internal quotations marks and citations omitted). 
 
Regarding the first step of the inquiry, the Appellants 
correctly “assume[]” that their Bivens claim, premised as it is 
on a violation of the right to marry, arises in a “new context.”  
(Appellants’ Opening Br. at 27 n.11.)  The Supreme Court has 
never recognized, or been asked to recognize, a Bivens remedy 
for infringement of the right to marry.  Accordingly, we turn to 
the inquiry’s second step. 
 
When we do, it is evident that there are “special factors” 
militating against extending Bivens to reach the Appellants’ 
claim, particularly since that claim arises in a prison setting.  
Those factors include, but are not necessarily limited to, 
Congress’s post-Bivens promulgation of the Prison Litigation 
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Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) 5 and the potential availability 
of alternative remedies to the Appellants, such as injunctive 
relief,6 or relief under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(“RFRA”).7  Because “there are sound reasons to think 
 
5 See  Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1865 (2017) 
(noting with respect to the PLRA that Congress “had specific 
occasion to consider the matter of prisoner abuse and to 
consider the proper way to remedy those wrongs[,]” but 
deliberately chose to “not provide for a standalone damages 
remedy against federal jailers” and that “legislative action 
suggesting that Congress does not want a damages remedy is 
itself a factor counseling hesitation” against extending Bivens). 
 
6 See Ziglar at 1862-63 (noting that the “damages or 
nothing” considerations underlying Bivens liability are not 
present in cases, such as this, where the Appellants “challenge 
large-scale policy decisions concerning the conditions of 
confinement imposed on hundreds of prisoners[,]” because 
“detainees may seek injunctive relief[,]” and that the Supreme 
Court also has “left open the question whether [detainees] 
might be able to challenge their confinement conditions via a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus”). 
 
7 See Ziglar at 1858 (“For if Congress has created any 
alternative, existing process for protecting the [injured party’s] 
interest that itself may amoun[t] to a convincing reason for the 
Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and 
freestanding remedy in damages.”) (alterations in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Mack v. Warden Loretto 
FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 305 (3d Cir. 2016) (declining to extend 
Bivens to Muslim inmate’s Free Exercise claim, alleging that 
he was subjected to anti-Muslim harassment from two 
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Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages 
remedy” for interfering with an inmate’s right to marry, Ziglar 
v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1848 (2017), no extension of Bivens 
is warranted here, and we will affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of the Appellants’ Bivens claim.  
 
B. Dismissal of the Conspiracy Claim Under 42 
 U.S.C. § 1985(3) 
 
Although the GEO Defendants did not request it in their 
motion to dismiss, the Magistrate Judge, sua sponte, 
recommended dismissal of the Appellants’ discrimination 
claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).  “Section 1985(3) 
permits an action to be brought by one injured by a conspiracy 
formed for the purpose of depriving, either directly or 
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal 
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities 
under the laws.”  Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 134 
(3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
According to the R&R, where “one or more” of the alleged 
conspirators “are private citizens,” a § 1985(3) claim cannot be 
sustained unless the claim involves either the right to be free 
from involuntary servitude or the right to interstate travel.  (JA 
11 n.2.)   
 
 
correctional officers, since there was an alternative remedial 
scheme available to inmate under the RFRA).  The Appellants 
evidently believe they have a viable RFRA claim against the 
defendants and intended to seek leave on remand to further 
amend their Amended Complaint to include such a claim.   
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That conclusion, though, is flawed because the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence regarding private conspiracies and the 
rights that can be vindicated under § 1985(3) pertains only to 
conspiracies that are purely private, that is, to conspiracies that 
do not involve any government actor at all.  See, e.g., Bray v. 
Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 278 (1993) 
(“[D]eprivation of [the federal right to abortion] cannot be the 
object of a purely private conspiracy.”); United Bhd. of 
Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 
463 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1983) (holding no § 1985 conspiracy 
claim against trades council, union and individual members for 
alleged infringement of First Amendment rights); see also 
Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d at 805 (alleging conspiracy among 
private entities in and supporting the tobacco industry did not 
state viable claim under § 1985(3)).  Even assuming that the 
GEO Defendants could rightly be regarded as private actors 
and not as government agents, the Appellants say that those 
defendants conspired with at least one of the Federal 
Defendants to deprive them – and, in fact, all of MVCC’s 
inmates – of the constitutional right to marry, not based on 
legitimate penological interests but rather because of invidious 
discrimination.  We agree that the Appellants have not alleged 
a purely private conspiracy, and, consequently, a basic premise 
of the District Court’s decision on the availability of § 1985(3) 
relief was erroneous.  We will accordingly vacate the dismissal 
of the Appellants’ § 1985(3) claim, while noting that we are 
not opining on the merit of it.  We are saying only that the 
rationale given for the order of dismissal presently before us 
was wrong.   
 
 We understand that the Appellants, now aided by 
counsel, intend on remand to seek leave to further amend their 
Amended Complaint.  As that may be permitted and may affect 
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the contours of, and the allegations supporting, the Appellants’ 
§ 1985(3) claim, we will – with one limited exception – decline 
to address here the parties’ additional arguments concerning 
the viability of that claim.  The exception is the Federal 
Defendants’ contention that our decision in Bethea v. Reid, 445 
F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1971), forecloses any § 1985(3) claim 
against federal actors or those acting under color of federal law.     
 
The Federal Defendants are correct that Bethea says 
§ 1985(3) does not reach federal officers acting under color of 
federal law.  Id. at 1164 (noting that the district court’s 
rejection of plaintiff’s § 1985 claim “was correct” because 
defendants “were federal officers acting under color of federal 
law”).  But the opinion said so in a single sentence, and neither 
of the cases cited in support of that statement, Jobson v. Henne, 
355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966), and Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 
855 (5th Cir. 1964), stand easily for that proposition.8  
Importantly, Bethea makes no reference to Griffin v. 
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), which the Supreme Court 
decided a few weeks earlier.  In Griffin, the Supreme Court 
 
8 Jobson involved neither any claim under § 1985(3) nor 
any claim against federal actors.  Rather, it addressed only a 
claim under § 1983 against state actors.  Jobson, 355 F.2d at 
131.  And, although one of the claims at issue in Norton was 
brought pursuant to § 1985(3), the federal character of the 
defendants was irrelevant to the claim’s disposition.  Instead, 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of 
that claim because the plaintiffs had failed “to allege facts 
amounting to intentional and purposeful discrimination to the 
plaintiffs individually or as members of a class.” Norton, 332 
F.2d at 863.    
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held that § 1985(3) can reach purely private conspiracies 
because the statute’s failure to require the “deprivation to come 
from the State…. can be viewed as an important indication of 
congressional intent to speak in § 1985(3) of all deprivations 
of ‘equal protection of the laws’ and ‘equal privileges and 
immunities under the laws,’ whatever their source.”  Griffin, 
403 U.S. at 97 (emphasis added).  A significant consensus 
among our sister Courts of Appeals is that Griffin has rendered 
untenable the argument that § 1985(3) is inapplicable to those 
acting under color of federal law.9   
 
Since the decisions in Griffin and Bethea were rendered 
in close succession, it is quite possible that the failure to 
mention – let alone analyze the application of Griffin in Bethea 
– was unintentional.  Whatever the reason, however, that 
failure to address significant and likely dispositive Supreme 
Court precedent prompts us to conclude that Bethea does not 
constitute binding precedent on the issue of whether a claim 
under § 1985(3) can be brought against federal actors.  See 
United States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 542 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(declining to apply ostensibly binding precedent because the 
opinion in question did not address pertinent Supreme Court 
 
9 Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 176 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d 
on other grounds sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 
(2009); Ogden v. United States, 758 F.2d 1168, 1175 n.3 (7th 
Cir. 1985); Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1984), 
overruled in part on other grounds by Leatherman v. Tarrant 
Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 
163 (1993); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 
1980); Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926, 
931 (10th Cir. 1975). 
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authority and was inconsistent with that authority).  Indeed, not 
only have we never cited Bethea for the principle that 
§ 1985(3) is inapplicable to federal actors, we have suggested 
precisely the opposite.  See Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 
775 (3d Cir. 1989) (reversing dismissal of complaint under 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(d) because, in part, “appellant may have stated 
a claim for conspiracy under § 1985” against various federal 
probation and parole officials).  Accordingly, we join  many of 
our sister Circuits in holding that § 1985(3) can redress 
conspiracies to violate constitutional rights involving those 
acting under color of federal law.     
 
C. Dismissal on the Merits of Additional Claims 
 
The District Court also dismissed on the merits the 
Appellants’ claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 
1983 and 2000d.10  There was no error in that. 
 
Claims under Section 1983 require action taken under 
color of state, not federal law. See Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 
at 800 (noting that Section 1983 “is addressed only to the state 
and to those acting under color of state authority” and that “[i]t 
is well established that liability under § 1983 will not attach for 
actions taken under color of federal law.”)  All of the 
 
10  As relevant to the Appellants’ claims, Section 1981 
prohibits discrimination in the making and enforcement of 
contracts on the basis of race; Section 1983 prohibits state 
actors from depriving any individual of their constitutional 
rights; and Section 2000d prohibits discrimination by programs 
or activities receiving federal financial assistance on the basis 
of race, color, or national origin.      
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defendants here, however, are alleged to be federal actors or to 
have acted under color of federal law, so the 1983 claim cannot 
stand.   
 
Nor can the Appellants’ Sections 1981 and 2000d 
claims.  Those require allegations of discrimination based on 
color or race, or, in the case of § 2000d, national origin.11  Even 
accounting for the Appellants’ pro se status at the time they 
filed the Amended Complaint, their pleading is devoid of 
allegations plausibly stating a claim for discrimination based 
on race, color, or national origin.  According to the Amended 
Complaint, all inmates housed at MVCC, irrespective of their 
race, color, or national origin, have been wrongfully deprived 
of the right to marry.  It was proper, then, to dismiss those 
claims. 
 
 
11  See Estate of Oliva ex rel. McHugh v. New Jersey, 
604 F.3d 788, 797 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Ordinarily, to establish a 
basis for relief under section 1981 a plaintiff must show (1) that 
he belongs to a racial minority; (2) an intent to discriminate on 
the basis of race by the defendant; and (3) discrimination 
concerning one or more of the activities enumerated in 
§ 1981.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 
Scelsa v. City Univ. of N.Y., 806 F. Supp. 1126, 1140 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992) (“‘The two elements for establishing a cause of action 
pursuant to [§ 2000d] are (1) that the entity involved is 
engaging in racial or national origin discrimination and (2) the 
entity involved is receiving federal financial aid.’”) (quoting 
Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896, 903 (E.D.Mo. 1979), 
aff’d 620 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1980)). 
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In contrast, however, the District Court dismissed 
several claims against the GEO Defendants that those 
defendants did not move to dismiss and that neither the District 
Court’s opinion nor the R&R on which it was based addressed 
at all.12  Consequently, we will vacate the District Court’s 
dismissal of those claims, while affirming the dismissal of the 
claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 2000d. 
 
D. Dismissal of Claims for Failure to Prosecute13 
 
Finally, the District Court also dismissed the claims 
against the Federal Defendants on the procedural ground that 
the Appellants had failed to properly serve them with process 
in accordance with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  That order of dismissal, based on the Magistrate 
 
12 Those claims include ones brought pursuant to the 
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution; 45 C.F.R. 
§ 3.6 (prohibiting discrimination in use of facilities that are “of 
a public nature”); 28 C.F.R. §42.104 (prohibiting 
discrimination in programs receiving federal financial 
assistance); article I, section 26 (misidentified as Article I, 
Section VI in the Amended Complaint) of the Constitution of 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (prohibiting the 
Commonwealth from discriminating against any person for 
exercising their civil rights); as well as claims under 
Pennsylvania law for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress and breach of contract.   
 
13 We review dismissals for failure to prosecute or to 
comply with a court order for abuse of discretion.  Emerson v. 
Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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Judge’s sua sponte recommendation, was not a proper exercise 
of discretion.  
 
“The determination whether to extend time [under Rule 
4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] involves a two-
step inquiry.  The district court first determines whether good 
cause exists for a plaintiff’s failure to effect timely service.  If 
good cause exists, the extension must be granted.  If good cause 
does not exist, the district court must consider whether to grant 
a discretionary extension of time.”  Boley v. Kaymark, 123 F.3d 
756, 758 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted).   
 
The Magistrate Judge, and the District Court by virtue 
of its adoption of the R&R, did not undertake either of those 
required steps.  The Court did not address the Appellants’ 
December 2017 statement detailing their further efforts to 
effectuate service on the Federal Defendants, and likewise 
failed to take note of the Federal Defendants’ post-R&R 
request for an extension of time to respond to the Amended 
Complaint, which relief the Magistrate Judge actually granted.  
The Federal Defendants apparently were willing to proceed 
with the case in some manner and, but for the order of 
dismissal, may have been willing to waive defects in the 
service of process.  That remains to be seen, though their late-
filed motion to reopen the case only to seek dismissal indicates 
otherwise.  In the meantime, we will vacate the District Court’s 
dismissal of the claims against the Federal Defendants. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part and 
vacate in part the District Court’s dismissal of the Appellants’ 
claims against the GEO Defendants, vacate the District Court’s 
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dismissal of the Appellants’ claims against the Federal 
Defendants for failure to prosecute, and remand this case for 
further proceedings. 
